La idea de permitir ubicaciones GPS simuladas en Grindr ha circulado durante años. Para muchos, especialmente quienes viven en entornos rurales o peligrosos, esta función parece una bendición. Poder establecer tu ubicación en una ciudad cercana podría ayudarte a conocer a más personas, planear citas para cuando viajes y evitar ser expuesto en un lugar inseguro. En países donde las personas LGBTQ+ sufren acoso o persecución, una ubicación simulada podría incluso salvar vidas.

A primera vista, parece inofensivo: apareces en otro lugar del mapa, conectas con gente nueva y tal vez los conoces más adelante cuando realmente estés allí. Nadie sale perjudicado… ¿verdad? Lamentablemente, no es tan sencillo. Las ubicaciones simuladas pueden resolver un riesgo importante de privacidad, pero también habilitan otro que la mayoría de usuarios de Grindr ni siquiera conoce: los ataques de trilateración.

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¿Qué es un ataque de trilateración?

La trilateración es un método para localizar con exactitud a una persona midiendo su distancia desde varios puntos diferentes. El propio GPS usa la trilateración para determinar tu posición a partir de satélites, pero el mismo proceso se puede invertir para descubrir la ubicación de otra persona si se sabe a qué distancia está de ti.

Así funciona en Grindr:

1. La app ordena los perfiles según la proximidad. Incluso si alguien tiene activada la opción “Ocultar mi distancia”, Grindr sigue conociendo sus coordenadas exactas y las usa para ordenar la lista.

2. Un atacante puede falsificar su ubicación GPS (o moverse físicamente) a tres o más puntos alrededor del objetivo.

3. En cada punto, estima la distancia al objetivo, ya sea por el número exacto si aparece, o por el cambio de posición en la lista de perfiles.

4. Dibuja un círculo alrededor de cada punto con ese radio. Donde los círculos se cruzan, está la ubicación exacta del objetivo, a menudo con precisión de pocos metros.

Esto significa que alguien podría descubrir dónde vives o trabajas sin que se lo digas, solo con paciencia y persistencia. Este método ha sido demostrado por investigadores y, lamentablemente, usado en casos reales de acoso y seguimiento.

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El dilema

Permitir ubicaciones simuladas sí dificulta a los atacantes la trilateración, porque si los usuarios pueden moverse libremente, es más difícil saber cuáles mediciones son “reales”. Por eso, algunos ven el GPS simulado como una herramienta de protección.

Pero también abre la puerta a usos maliciosos:

Hacer catfishing desde una ciudad falsa.

Evitar responsabilidad tras plantar o desaparecer.

Ejecutar su propio ataque de trilateración sin acercarse físicamente a ti.

En otras palabras, la misma herramienta que protege a unos puede ser usada para engañar o rastrear a otros.

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Conclusión

Las ubicaciones simuladas en Grindr son un arma de doble filo. Para usuarios aislados o en riesgo, pueden ser un salvavidas. Pero también facilitan que personas malintencionadas manipulen o rastreen a otros. Si Grindr llegara a permitir oficialmente el GPS simulado, debería implementar salvaguardas sólidas: verificación opcional, monitoreo antiabuso y advertencias claras sobre la trilateración.

Hasta entonces, el debate seguirá: en la lucha entre privacidad y seguridad, no hay respuestas fáciles.

The idea of allowing mock GPS locations on Grindr has been circulating for years. For many, especially those in rural or dangerous environments, this feature sounds like a blessing. Being able to set your location to a nearby city could help you meet more people, arrange dates for when you travel, and avoid being outed in an unsafe area. In countries where LGBTQ+ people face harassment or persecution, a mock location could literally save lives.

On the surface, it seems harmless: you appear somewhere else on the map, connect with new people, and maybe meet them later when you’re actually there. No one gets hurt… right? Unfortunately, it’s not that simple. Mock locations can solve one major privacy risk, but they also enable another one that most Grindr users don’t even know exists — trilateration attacks.

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What is a trilateration attack?

Trilateration is a method of pinpointing someone’s exact location by taking multiple measurements of distance between them and different points on a map. GPS itself uses trilateration to figure out your position from satellites — but the same process can be reversed to figure out someone else’s position if you know how far they are from you.

Here’s how it works on Grindr:

1. The app sorts profiles by proximity. Even if someone has “Hide my distance” turned on, Grindr still knows their exact coordinates in the background and uses them to sort profiles.

2. An attacker can spoof their own GPS location (or physically move) to three or more different points around the target.

3. At each point, they estimate the target’s distance — either from the exact number if it’s shown, or from how far the target moves up or down in the profile list.

4. They draw a circle around each observer point with that radius. Where the circles intersect is the target’s exact location — often to within a few meters.

This means someone could figure out exactly where you live or work without you ever telling them, just by being persistent and patient. It’s been proven by researchers and unfortunately used in real-world harassment and stalking.

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The trade-off

Allowing mock locations does make trilateration harder for attackers — because if users can move themselves around freely, it’s harder to be sure which readings are “real.” This is why some see mock GPS as a protective tool.

But mock locations also open the door for malicious uses:

Catfishing from a fake city.

Avoiding accountability after ghosting or standing someone up.

Running their own trilateration attack without ever going near you physically.

In other words, the same tool that protects some users could also be abused to deceive or stalk others.

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The bottom line

Mock locations on Grindr are a double-edged sword. For isolated or at-risk users, they could be a lifeline. But they also lower the barrier for bad actors to manipulate or track people. If Grindr ever enables mock GPS officially, it needs strong safeguards — like optional verification, anti-abuse monitoring, and clearer warnings about trilateration.

Until then, the debate will continue: in the battle between privacy and safety, there are no easy answers.

LGBT people still need to protect themselves and hide their location when we still are living in a world that has hate crimes targeted against them.

Votei a favor desta sugestão! A permissão de locais fictícios no Grindr vai muito além da simples conveniência. Para muitos usuários, especialmente aqueles em áreas rurais e isoladas, essa funcionalidade pode ser a única forma de se conectar com a comunidade LGBTQIA+. Imaginar a dificuldade de alguém que mora longe dos centros urbanos e tem poucas oportunidades de conhecer outras pessoas como eles... um GPS simulado pode abrir um mundo de possibilidades e reduzir o isolamento.
Além disso, não podemos ignorar a questão da segurança. Em muitos lugares ao redor do mundo, a homofobia e a transfobia são uma realidade perigosa. Permitir locais fictícios pode ser uma ferramenta vital para proteger a identidade e a segurança de indivíduos que vivem em ambientes hostis, permitindo que explorem conexões sem se exporem a riscos desnecessários.
A alegação de que isso prejudicaria a autenticidade das conexões não se sustenta quando consideramos as necessidades de tantos usuários. Acreditamos que a implementação cuidadosa dessa funcionalidade, talvez com avisos claros sobre o uso de locais simulados, pode equilibrar a necessidade de conexão com a segurança e o bem-estar de todos. Grindr, por favor, considere seriamente essa solicitação e o impacto positivo que ela pode ter na vida de muitos de seus usuários.

* Inclusão: Permitir locais fictícios promove a inclusão de usuários que, de outra forma, estariam marginalizados devido à sua localização geográfica.
* Saúde Mental: A conexão social é crucial para a saúde mental. Para aqueles em áreas isoladas, o Grindr com essa funcionalidade pode ser uma importante ferramenta para combater a solidão e o isolamento.
* Comunidades Nichadas: Mesmo em áreas urbanas, alguns usuários podem querer se conectar com comunidades específicas que não estão geograficamente próximas. Locais fictícios poderiam facilitar essa conexão.
* Flexibilidade: Para viajantes ou pessoas que estão se mudando, a capacidade de simular sua localização pode ser útil para começar a construir conexões antes mesmo de chegarem ao seu destino.

You can't be serious ffs!

Why is this app turning into a intruders app. Midas well call in intruders ap

That could be a harmful tool used to also easily track someone down early before the process . Like a pre gps system that could track any profile down to the exact T. Idk but could be good could be bad. I'm just voicing my opinion no harm or love lost !

Don't agree. I think there is already a feature called 'Roam'. This is sufficient and also notifies users that the roaming profile is roaming

This would be a good idea if the mock location is 1km or more from actual included an irremovable 'watermark'. Something along the lines of ' This location has been selected for the privacy, discretion or safety of the user. The actual location is approximately **km from here". This enables the rights of users to keep their actual location private while enabling users to select a Town or Public area to meet others. Add a 'Select Location' and enable a pin to be dropped or 'Actual Location' leaving the pin where the user is.

This can be used to scam people. I’ve already come across a handful of fake accounts of Nigerian scammers who try to lead you off app to try and get money from you. They use fake locations to seem like they’re in your area to make you think they’re there. I’ve been the victim of those scams too ( they didn’t get my money, I just wasted it on travel). This is NOT a good idea.

No effin way. I'd go the other way and have the geolocated distance mandatory on the face of the profile & preceeding a message. The lotion & distance are as important as the age, race & position, IMHO.

90% of this apps users are creeps trying to hide their locations and scam people. This Business is all
About scamming people on purpose. This Business should be sued

You can't be serious ffs!

Why is this app turning into a intruders app. Midas well call in intruders app

Grinder if you bring mock location back you need to label on the guys profile that there using mock location so guys know there using my location we need to know this

If grinder was to allow mock location and I hit you up and I find out You're using mock location i will block you so fast it will make your head spin don't lie about you location I want to know how far you really are from me

No mock location laying about your location will get you no where if I was to ask to hook up with you and your distance show your 15 miles away from me because you used mock location and your really 30 miles away and I find out your 30 miles away when I look your location up on Google maps it will be a big automatic fat block for you so do you think mock location will help you out no it wont

I agree. I was taking to a guy and we were going to meet up at my place and I sent my location and he started acting sketchy so I told him I had to cancel and one random day I got back from work and he was standing at my driveway

I 100% agree with this I live in a small inbredneck town where gays are still persecuted and discriminated against as if we were in the early 1900's. If I choose to use a mock location to place myself in the city where there are other gay community members why should it be an issue at all? This app prioritizes all the wrong features and can't even function properly. Make it make sense! Shouldn't have to drive 45 minutes away to place myself in the view of the gay community. STOP HINDERING THE GAY COMMUNITY GRINDR!

These fucking people are using mock locations to fuck with people, harass, bully, manipulate and overall cause harm to people. The people whom are asking for this are the ones doing so.
Grindr already offers the explore feature for you to look in other areas while giving the person you’re messaging the ability to know you’re exploring.
Grindr did right by taking mock locations away from scamming ass, no life having, miserable, sorry ass excuses for men….

Karma is sweet when it gets you back for pain you inflict on others. Have a great day!

I agree with Juan.. I lived in a very "welcoming" village.. someone even told them ginder in the pub. Everyone was enjoying it. Now they're using it as a way to show off their bum

No don't lie about your location no one will want to drive to you once they revel your tru location and your 50 miles away what the fuck