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Craig Bruckman

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  1. Allow mock locations, please!

    1,657 votes

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    89 comments  ·  Grindr Feedback  ·  Admin →
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    Craig Bruckman commented  · 

    La idea de permitir ubicaciones GPS simuladas en Grindr ha circulado durante años. Para muchos, especialmente quienes viven en entornos rurales o peligrosos, esta función parece una bendición. Poder establecer tu ubicación en una ciudad cercana podría ayudarte a conocer a más personas, planear citas para cuando viajes y evitar ser expuesto en un lugar inseguro. En países donde las personas LGBTQ+ sufren acoso o persecución, una ubicación simulada podría incluso salvar vidas.

    A primera vista, parece inofensivo: apareces en otro lugar del mapa, conectas con gente nueva y tal vez los conoces más adelante cuando realmente estés allí. Nadie sale perjudicado… ¿verdad? Lamentablemente, no es tan sencillo. Las ubicaciones simuladas pueden resolver un riesgo importante de privacidad, pero también habilitan otro que la mayoría de usuarios de Grindr ni siquiera conoce: los ataques de trilateración.

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    ¿Qué es un ataque de trilateración?

    La trilateración es un método para localizar con exactitud a una persona midiendo su distancia desde varios puntos diferentes. El propio GPS usa la trilateración para determinar tu posición a partir de satélites, pero el mismo proceso se puede invertir para descubrir la ubicación de otra persona si se sabe a qué distancia está de ti.

    Así funciona en Grindr:

    1. La app ordena los perfiles según la proximidad. Incluso si alguien tiene activada la opción “Ocultar mi distancia”, Grindr sigue conociendo sus coordenadas exactas y las usa para ordenar la lista.

    2. Un atacante puede falsificar su ubicación GPS (o moverse físicamente) a tres o más puntos alrededor del objetivo.

    3. En cada punto, estima la distancia al objetivo, ya sea por el número exacto si aparece, o por el cambio de posición en la lista de perfiles.

    4. Dibuja un círculo alrededor de cada punto con ese radio. Donde los círculos se cruzan, está la ubicación exacta del objetivo, a menudo con precisión de pocos metros.

    Esto significa que alguien podría descubrir dónde vives o trabajas sin que se lo digas, solo con paciencia y persistencia. Este método ha sido demostrado por investigadores y, lamentablemente, usado en casos reales de acoso y seguimiento.

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    El dilema

    Permitir ubicaciones simuladas sí dificulta a los atacantes la trilateración, porque si los usuarios pueden moverse libremente, es más difícil saber cuáles mediciones son “reales”. Por eso, algunos ven el GPS simulado como una herramienta de protección.

    Pero también abre la puerta a usos maliciosos:

    Hacer catfishing desde una ciudad falsa.

    Evitar responsabilidad tras plantar o desaparecer.

    Ejecutar su propio ataque de trilateración sin acercarse físicamente a ti.

    En otras palabras, la misma herramienta que protege a unos puede ser usada para engañar o rastrear a otros.

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    Conclusión

    Las ubicaciones simuladas en Grindr son un arma de doble filo. Para usuarios aislados o en riesgo, pueden ser un salvavidas. Pero también facilitan que personas malintencionadas manipulen o rastreen a otros. Si Grindr llegara a permitir oficialmente el GPS simulado, debería implementar salvaguardas sólidas: verificación opcional, monitoreo antiabuso y advertencias claras sobre la trilateración.

    Hasta entonces, el debate seguirá: en la lucha entre privacidad y seguridad, no hay respuestas fáciles.

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    Craig Bruckman commented  · 

    The idea of allowing mock GPS locations on Grindr has been circulating for years. For many, especially those in rural or dangerous environments, this feature sounds like a blessing. Being able to set your location to a nearby city could help you meet more people, arrange dates for when you travel, and avoid being outed in an unsafe area. In countries where LGBTQ+ people face harassment or persecution, a mock location could literally save lives.

    On the surface, it seems harmless: you appear somewhere else on the map, connect with new people, and maybe meet them later when you’re actually there. No one gets hurt… right? Unfortunately, it’s not that simple. Mock locations can solve one major privacy risk, but they also enable another one that most Grindr users don’t even know exists — trilateration attacks.

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    What is a trilateration attack?

    Trilateration is a method of pinpointing someone’s exact location by taking multiple measurements of distance between them and different points on a map. GPS itself uses trilateration to figure out your position from satellites — but the same process can be reversed to figure out someone else’s position if you know how far they are from you.

    Here’s how it works on Grindr:

    1. The app sorts profiles by proximity. Even if someone has “Hide my distance” turned on, Grindr still knows their exact coordinates in the background and uses them to sort profiles.

    2. An attacker can spoof their own GPS location (or physically move) to three or more different points around the target.

    3. At each point, they estimate the target’s distance — either from the exact number if it’s shown, or from how far the target moves up or down in the profile list.

    4. They draw a circle around each observer point with that radius. Where the circles intersect is the target’s exact location — often to within a few meters.

    This means someone could figure out exactly where you live or work without you ever telling them, just by being persistent and patient. It’s been proven by researchers and unfortunately used in real-world harassment and stalking.

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    The trade-off

    Allowing mock locations does make trilateration harder for attackers — because if users can move themselves around freely, it’s harder to be sure which readings are “real.” This is why some see mock GPS as a protective tool.

    But mock locations also open the door for malicious uses:

    Catfishing from a fake city.

    Avoiding accountability after ghosting or standing someone up.

    Running their own trilateration attack without ever going near you physically.

    In other words, the same tool that protects some users could also be abused to deceive or stalk others.

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    The bottom line

    Mock locations on Grindr are a double-edged sword. For isolated or at-risk users, they could be a lifeline. But they also lower the barrier for bad actors to manipulate or track people. If Grindr ever enables mock GPS officially, it needs strong safeguards — like optional verification, anti-abuse monitoring, and clearer warnings about trilateration.

    Until then, the debate will continue: in the battle between privacy and safety, there are no easy answers.

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    Craig Bruckman commented  · 

    Mock Locations makes trilateration very easy. In other words people can pin-point your precise location by knowing your distance from 3 or so sets of GPS coordinates. And if your think turning off your distance would prevent this. If someone really wants to find your location, they can just create another profile and spoof that one until you’re “sandwiched in” between two profiles on their grid of known distance that are similar.

  2. Exact distance shouldn't be shown for people less than a km away

    10 votes

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    1 comment  ·  Grindr Feedback » Safety & Privacy  ·  Admin →
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    Craig Bruckman commented  · 

    They can just use the iOS app or the website FreeMapTools (Radius around a point) to pinpoint your location within 10 meters.

  3. Have a way to filter out bots solicitation and scams

    25,041 votes

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    2823 comments  ·  Grindr Feedback  ·  Admin →
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    Craig Bruckman commented  · 

    The distance displayed essentially advertises your EXACT location to every Grindr user that is logged into the app. This distance is updated every time you send a message or refresh the app. Anyone can then EASILY calculate the location of your home, work, church, bar, trick’s house (and who you probably fucked last night). This is called trilateration and it can be calculated by spreadsheet or other computer promgram that utilizes complex geodesic equations…..or very simply using FreeMapTools/Radius Around a Point and drawing circles using the distance as the radius with respect to each “center point”. The target is simply at the intercection.

    Most people would actually be very uncomfortable after reading this and will likely disable their distance as well.

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